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Abstract 
Time is of the essence in relation to climate change. However, there have been few 
studies of how time features as a frame in legal mobilization against climate change. 
The current article explores temporal framing in a number of high profile climate 
litigation cases, including Urgenda, Kivalina, Kingsnorth, and the current US Our 
Children’s Trust proceedings. I argue that there is a tension between a future-looking 
scientific framing of time and both an environmentalist policy framing of time and a 
present-based scientific time frame. Under future-looking scientific framing, the 
effects of dangerous climate change have not yet occurred and remain some way off 
in the ‘modelled’ future. Under an environmentalist policy time frame, action is 
needed immediately, now in the present, and with a present scientific time frame 
climate harm is already happening or is imminent. 
Key words 
Time; temporality; framing; climate change litigation; legal mobilization  
Resumen 
El tiempo es esencial en relación con el cambio climático. Sin embargo, se han hecho 
pocos estudios sobre la manera en que se designan los marcos temporales en la 
movilización legal contra el cambio climático. El presente artículo examina la 
designación de marcos temporales en una serie de casos jurídicos contra el cambio 
climático de gran notoriedad pública, como Urgenda, Kivalina, Kingsnorth, y los 
actuales procesos de Our Children's Trust en EEUU. Argumento que hay una tensión 
entre el marco temporal científico de cara al futuro y el marco temporal de la ciencia 
basada en el momento actual. Según el marco científico a largo plazo, los efectos 
peligrosos del cambio climático todavía no han ocurrido y quedan a cierta distancia 
en un futuro proyectado. Bajo el prisma de la política medioambiental, se necesita 
una acción inmediata, ahora, en el presente; y, de acuerdo con un marco científico 
actual, el daño climático ya está sucediendo o es inminente. 
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1. Introduction 
Writing in 2015, Adam Crawford observed that there had been little in the way of 
engagement with time and temporality in the fields of criminology and socio-legal 
studies (Crawford 2015). Since then – prompted in part by recent emphasis on the 
Anthropocene as a period – work has begun to emerge which looks at the role of time 
within environmental law (Richardson 2017a, 2017b). While that work discusses 
issues ranging from grandfathering and cost-benefit analysis to sustainable 
development and adaptive governance, its focus is not specifically on climate change. 
Time is of course no stranger to academic work on climate change. It has, for 
example, featured strongly in climate ethics, where ideas of historical responsibility 
for climate emissions and obligations owed to future generations combine elements 
of the past, the present and the future (Page 2006, McKinnon 2012). Climate change 
also involves questions of risk and liability, with discussion around the precautionary 
principle (de Sadeleer 2016) and, especially post-Paris, loss and damage (Vanhala 
and Hestbaek 2016, Lees 2017). Risk is very much forward looking, trying – in the 
present – to anticipate what might happen in the future and with what consequences. 
Liability, in contrast, looks backward from the present, considering the basis on which 
current actors might be held liable for their past behaviours (although, insofar as 
foreseeability is a requirement of liability, it too involves anticipation, in the past, of 
what was then the future).  
Time is inherently connected with space. As Crawford notes, systems of justice and 
social regulation express “what Bakhtin described as the ‘intrinsic connectedness of 
temporal and spatial relationships’” (Bakhtin, cited in Crawford 2015, p. 472). This is 
obviously true not only of the criminal, restorative justice system which Crawford is 
examining, but also of climate justice and regulation. Discussion of both 
responsibilities for cutting greenhouse gas emissions and compensation for loss and 
damage are, for example, very much tied in with spatial as well as the temporal 
considerations examined above. It matters where emissions have taken place 
historically as well as when they occurred because developed countries have emitted 
more than their fair share during their earlier industrial and consumer revolutions. 
Developing countries therefore argue that climate justice now requires developed 
countries to take on the greater burden of reducing emissions and to help 
compensate those who are unable to adapt and who go on to suffer loss and damage. 
Questions of scale, and space and place have been explored in socio-legal literature 
on climate change – especially from a law and geography perspective. Hari Osofsky 
(2005) has written on the spatial dynamics of climate change litigation, looking in 
particular at how its multi-scalar properties contribute to transnational governance. 
In previous work, Lisa Vanhala and I have similarly noted how climate change 
litigation is often situated in scalar terms, expressed in terms of it helping to fill a 
governance gap where states and the international community have been slow to act 
on climate change (Vanhala and Hilson 2013). Graeme Hayes combines both scalar 
and temporal elements in describing how witness testimony in the Kingsnorth trial of 
climate activists managed to make the “global, distant, abstract, and immaterial” 
nature of climate change “relevant to the concrete, material, local, and immediate 
concerns” of the local citizenry serving on the jury (Hayes 2013, p. 221). 
However, while the socio-legal literature on climate change has considered issues of 
scale and place, it has not really directly tackled time as a separate element.1My aim 
in the current article is to examine the role that time plays in climate change litigation. 
Like Crawford, I am not suggesting that the temporal can easily be separated from 
the spatial. Spatial issues often form the background context to much of this litigation 
– as we have just seen above in the Kingsnorth case. The same is also true, for 
example, of the Kivalina (2012) case where the plaintiffs were seeking damages to 
pay for spatial relocation as a result of climate change. Nevertheless, I am seeking 
to focus on the temporal aspects of such cases. And while I am concentrating on the 
                                                 
1 Richardson (2017a) makes a similar point about environmental law more generally. 
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role of time in climate change litigation specifically rather than temporality within 
climate change more generally, I will inevitably be drawing on those broader debates, 
which form the background policy context for climate litigation. Equally, I anticipate 
that my discussion of time in climate case law should also prove instructive in thinking 
about temporality in climate law and policy more broadly. Whichever way one looks 
at it, time is of the essence in relation to climate change. 
Time is potentially relevant in a number of different respects in relation to climate 
change litigation. Thus, litigation may, for example, be used as a temporal delaying 
strategy by the climate movement to drag out the eventual granting of permission 
to a climate unfriendly development such as a coal mine.  However, in examining the 
role that time plays in climate change litigation, my focus in the current article is on 
the key types of time frames found within legal judgments and litigant submissions 
or pleadings. I am, in other words, looking at time and time frames within the 
argumentative context of the cases themselves. After coming up with a number of 
temporal frames, I argue that there is an important tension between future scientific 
time frames on the one hand and (environmentalist) policy time frames and present 
scientific time frames on the other. While time framing is largely irrelevant in most 
cases in terms of legal doctrine, this is not universally so. In so-called “reactive” 
climate change litigation involving the prosecution of climate protestors for certain 
types of criminal offences, I argue that environmentalist policy time framing poses 
particular doctrinal challenges for the courts. As we shall see, admitting the need for 
temporal immediacy of (policy) action on climate change in the context of certain 
defences has the potential to be legally disruptive (Fisher et al. 2017). 
2. Framing 
The article begins with an attempt to separate out different types of time frames 
within the case law on climate change. Time is employed in very different ways both 
between cases and within them. I argue that it is important to separate them out 
more systematically because this may prove strategically useful to those engaged in 
climate change litigation in the future.   
Framing is used here to refer to the process of constructing an interpretive view of a 
phenomenon or issue such as climate change. As Hänggli and Kriesi (2012, p. 266) 
observe, “[f]raming is the process by which political actors define the issue for their 
audience (…). A frame highlights some aspects of a perceived reality and enhances a 
certain interpretation or evaluation of reality”. My contention is that time can be 
considered an important type of frame both within the overall policy debate on 
climate change and also, more specifically, within climate change litigation. How we 
see climate change is not a neutral fact existing out there: it is socially constructed 
and, in putting forward arguments in political campaigning or in court, actors 
inevitably choose certain frames. Time is a key element in this respect. One might, 
for example, stress the way in which climate change calls for immediate action rather 
than further delay (an immediacy frame). Equally, actors may choose to emphasise 
the impact that climate change will have on future generations of humans (future 
generations framing or, in purely temporal terms, future framing). 
My sense is that while time framing on occasions appears to be a conscious, strategic 
choice by movement actors2 – the Our Children’s Trust (OCT) deliberate use of future 
generations described further below is a good example – for the most part time plays 
more of a background role. In other words, actors employ time discourse during their 
arguments, but it is probably not conceived of as a separate frame in its own right. 
My hope is that the current article may lead to a better appreciation of the role that 
time plays and how it may be consciously and strategically employed in climate 
change litigation as a frame. In summary then, some time frames are quite apparent 
and already appear to have been explicitly employed; others are perhaps less obvious 
                                                 
2 Of course this would require empirical research to establish more concretely. 
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and one of the aims of the current article is to draw attention to them as time frames 
that can be consciously used in a similar manner. 
3. Research design 
In terms of research design, the article’s methods are relatively straightforward. The 
cases I initially selected were those which have become well-known in the existing 
legal and socio-legal literature on climate change (what one might regard as the 
“poster child” climate change litigation cases) which I knew from the literature or the 
cases themselves had a temporal element to them. The Urgenda, Kivalina, Our 
Children’s Trust (Juliana) and Kingsnorth cases fall into this category. These then 
typically led me to other cases (particularly recent ones) which I then searched for 
temporal wording (e.g. immediate, imminent, urgent, future generations). The 
Norwegian Barents Sea oil case (Greenpeace Norden v Norway) is an example there. 
The cases come from all over the world – time framing is mostly not particularly 
legally relevant in a doctrinal sense and hence one need not focus on particular 
jurisdictions. The exception to this is in relation to cases involving the necessity 
defence to various criminal charges (which are peculiar to common law jurisdictions 
such as the UK, the US and Australia). 
In setting out different time frames, my aim is not to provide an exhaustive typology. 
When you look, time in one sense or another is almost omnipresent in the case law. 
To some extent, there is arguably also a danger of doing with time what Liz Fisher 
warned against with the precautionary principle – viz. “precaution spotting” (or, here, 
“time spotting”). As she wryly observed, “[t]here seems to be a new and very popular 
game called ‘precaution spotting’. The rules are very simple - each contestant gains 
points for collecting examples of the precautionary principle in different jurisdictions, 
whether they be national, trans-national or international” (Fisher 2002, p. 7). My 
reason for being wary of time spotting is not the same as Fisher’s concerns around 
the precautionary principle, which was that spotting tends to ignore the important 
context of the specific legal cultures in which examples are found. After all, as I have 
noted above, in the present context, time typically has no particular role to play 
within legal doctrine in any event. What I want to do is not merely to collect numerous 
different examples of temporal language in climate change litigation, but rather to 
point out some of the key different time frames. The aim is not to arrive at an 
exhaustive listing of all of the senses or ways in which time is employed, but to 
separate out what I see as the most significant uses of time, with a view to providing 
insights for future framing strategy by movement actors. 
The number of cases I ended up looking at was relatively small (around ten). After 
looking in depth at a certain number to ascertain different forms of time reasoning, 
the core frames emerged through an inductive process. Looking at further cases 
yielded no further core frames, which suggested that, at that point, data saturation 
had effectively been achieved. 
4. Time Frames 
An investigation of the case law revealed several main forms of time framing. First, 
there are generational time frames. As will be seen in the more detailed section 
below, the focus tends to be on future generations of humans, but there is often also 
reference made to present generations and also, on occasions, to past generations. 
This generational framing tends to map onto what might be regarded as a separate, 
though linked, type of temporal framing involving one or more of the past, the 
present and the future. In other words, all of these three can be mentioned without 
an explicit human generational element. When visible all together (particularly in 
generational terms), they can be seen as forming a continuity frame. Both the 
generational and continuity frames are largely about human enjoyment of the 
benefits of the climate system over time and the negative and irreversible impacts 
that climate change is causing and will cause in the future.  However, there is another 
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reason for not relying just on future generations or future frames, which is that – in 
common with scientific framing discussed below – they can end up sending out the 
wrong, unintended message, to the effect that climate change is something that is 
only an issue for the future. If it is only an issue for the future then it is all too likely 
to be discounted.3 
Second, there are scientific time frames. These may be future looking, present-based 
or past looking. Future or forward looking scientific time frames have an eye on 
climate models which tell us that we still have some, albeit limited, time left in the 
future to take action on climate change before dangerous levels of global warming 
occur. Past or backward looking scientific time frames are more concerned, in liability 
suits, with attribution of particular climate harms to historic emitters of greenhouse 
gases. As we shall see, claimants or plaintiffs have tended to struggle with time here 
in relation to establishing causation. Closely linked with future looking scientific time 
frames, but somewhat antithetical to them, are present-based scientific time frames. 
Rather than claiming we have time left in the future before dangerous climate change 
really hits us, this frame states that climate harm is either present or imminent – in 
other words it exists now or is virtually upon us.  
Finally, there are policy time frames. An environmentalist policy-based view regards 
climate change as an “urgent” risk in the sense that it requires “immediate” policy 
action to be taken by governments to tackle it. Governments are also typically 
implored to avoid “delay” in doing so. Policy time frames thus have something in 
common with present-based scientific frames in that they may employ similar 
language (such as imminence and immediacy). However, they are different in the 
sense that present-based scientific frames are about harms being suffered now (or 
any minute now, as in imminence), whereas environmentalist policy time framing is 
about the need for policy action now (immediacy, without delay). The following 
sections will now explore these three different types of time framing in more detail. 
4.1. Generational time frames 
Like the Philippines Supreme Court Minors Oposa (1993) case, the Our Children’s 
Trust (n.d.) cases are typically characterised as lawsuits about intergenerational 
equity and our responsibilities towards future generations (see e.g. Rogers 2013, 
2015). On one level that is of course understandable because the future generations 
element to such cases is arguably the stand-out legal novelty: can lawsuits be 
brought on behalf of future generations or otherwise seek to represent their 
interests? However, as we shall see, in temporal terms, the relevant cases in fact 
involve not just references to the future, but also the present and the past. 
In Minors Oposa, a group of children, including those of the well-known 
environmental activist Antonio Oposa, joined the Philippine Ecological Network to 
challenge government inaction in tackling deforestation.4 The children asserted that 
they represented their “generation as well as generations yet unborn”. They claimed 
that the serious and irreparable harm caused to their generation and to future 
generations by the continued trend of deforestation was “evident and 
incontrovertible”. They also noted that relevant environmental damage from 
government-granted rainforest timber licences was “already being felt, experienced 
and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults”. 
                                                 
3 This might be both literally and also in terms of economic discounting by applying a discount rate. On 
discounting and climate change, see e.g. Caney (2014). 
4 Although not framed in terms of climate change at the time (but rather one about local environmental 
degradation), insofar as it deals with deforestation and the depletion of carbon sinks, the case might be 
seen as a form of non-explicit climate change litigation.    
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In the (ongoing) OCT Juliana case,5 the plaintiffs are young people from all over the 
US,6 ranging in age from 9 to 20, along with the famous climate scientist James 
Hansen – himself acting as a guardian for future generations – and his 
granddaughter. Their claim against the US federal government was filed in the US 
District Court for the District of Oregon in 2015 and has faced a number of challenges 
seeking to dismiss the case. None of these have proved successful and a trial date 
has been set for 29 October 2018.  
The plaintiffs in the case are alleging that the US federal government and its agencies 
have, despite knowledge of its significantly harmful climate impacts, allowed fossil 
fuel exploitation, production and consumption to continue. They argue that their 
constitutional rights to life, liberty, and property have thereby been breached and, 
drawing on the public trust doctrine, that the defendants have violated their 
obligation to hold certain natural resources in trust for the people and for future 
generations. In terms of remedies, they are seeking a declaration that their 
constitutional and public trust rights have been violated and an order prohibiting the 
defendants from violating those rights and directing them to develop a plan to reduce 
CO2 emissions. 
Also of interest is the case brought by Greenpeace and Nature and Youth against the 
Norwegian Government in relation to the grant of oil and gas production licences in 
the (Arctic) Barents Sea (Greenpeace Norden v Norway, 2018). Nature and Youth is 
Norway’s largest young people’s environmental organisation. Article 112 of the 
Norwegian Constitution (1814) states that “Every person has the right to an 
environment that is conducive to health and to a natural environment whose 
productivity and diversity are maintained. Natural resources shall be managed on the 
basis of comprehensive long-term considerations which will safeguard this right for 
future generations as well”. The plaintiffs argued7 that granting petroleum licences is 
contrary to this constitutional right because the licences will give rise to carbon 
emissions well into the future and granting permission comes at a time when Norway 
should be making a committed effort to phase out reliance on fossil fuels. The claim 
is of interest not only for its future generations time framing – which here is very 
much aided by the constitutional language of Article 112 – but also, similar to Our 
Children’s Trust, for being brought in part by a youth organisation. 
Nicole Rogers has remarked that “the use of children as plaintiffs in the Children’s 
Trust lawsuits constitutes effective symbolism; they provide an embodied 
representation of the concept of intergenerational equity in the climate change 
context and their expression of personal grievance and deprivation through lawsuits 
evokes both guilt and a sense of responsibility in adult spectators” (Rogers 2015, p. 
185). These points about symbolism and embodiment are important and can be 
drawn out further in temporal terms. The Juliana case, like other OCT cases and the 
Norwegian Nature and Youth case above, is noteworthy for the way in which the 
plaintiff youth effectively act not only as a representation of future generations, but 
also as a present embodiment of that generation. They are in that sense both the 
present and future at the same time, forming a neat temporal bridge between the 
two.  
And, like the Minors Oposa (1993) case which, as we saw above, involved an 
emphasis on the present impacts on current adults as well as the impacts on future 
generations, the Juliana case similarly emphasises not just the impacts of climate 
change on the children’s future selves, but also its impacts on their lives in the 
                                                 
5 The Juliana case is just one of many OCT, public trust-based cases that have been brought in the US 
courts. It is focused on here because it is the one that has proceeded the furthest to date and where a full 
trial is due in the near future. 
6 Although the majority of the youth plaintiffs, including the lead plaintiff Kelsey Juliana, are resident in 
the District of Oregon where the case was filed. 
7 Unsuccessfully at first instance. The case has since been taken to appeal. 
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present. It further adds to this temporal range by referencing the past. In relation to 
effects felt in the present, the plaintiff submissions state that: 
Youth Plaintiffs are suffering both immediate and threatened injuries as a result of 
actions and omissions by Defendants alleged herein and will continue to suffer life-
threatening and irreversible injuries without the relief sought. (Juliana v US 2015, 
para. 96) 
This is accompanied by more concrete and relatable people-scale narratives provided 
in relation to individual youth plaintiffs. Thus, for example, we are told in relation to 
one of the plaintiffs that: 
The impacts from climate change caused by Defendants are harming and will continue 
to harm Avery and her enjoyment of and interaction with nature and wildlife. Avery’s 
favorite activity is swimming in natural bodies of water. Avery and her family enjoy 
boating, hiking, backpacking, camping, and watching salmon spawn throughout 
Oregon. In 2015, Avery was not been able [sic] to participate in these recreational 
activities as frequently as past years due to warmer temperatures, drought, low water 
levels, forest fires, and algal blooms. The 2015 summer heat has caused Avery to 
avoid outdoor activities to prevent becoming overheated. Avery also suffers from 
allergies, which will worsen with increased pollen count and a changing climate 
caused by Defendants. (Idem, para. 41) 
While this statement about Avery clearly documents effects felt by her in the present, 
a number of other personal stories also weave in connections back to the past. This 
helps to provide a sense of temporal continuity, giving rise to the expectation that 
this will be maintained and not extinguished by climate change: 
Alex lives on his family’s 570-acre farm, the Martha A. Maupin Century Farm (‘Maupin 
Century Farm’), located along the Umpqua River. His great, great, great, great 
grandmother, Martha Poindexter Maupin, founded the farm in 1868 (she was one of 
the first women in Oregon to own a ranch) after arriving in the area by way of the 
Oregon Trail. The Maupin Century Farm is Alex’s intellectual and spiritual base and a 
foundational piece of his life and heritage, and his identity and wellbeing depend on 
its preservation and protection. However, the drought conditions, unusually hot 
temperatures, and climate-induced migration of forest species are harming and will 
increasingly harm Alex’s use and enjoyment of the Maupin Century Farm. (Idem, 
para. 24)8 
As outlined earlier, one might easily see this in framing terms, with this narrative 
linking between the past, present and future amounting to a continuity frame. Such 
temporal framing has an increased resonance when tied to continuity around place, 
which one finds with Alex’s family farm here. 
In his scientific, expert witness-type contribution, James Hansen also touches, at 
various points, on the past, the present and the future. In relation to the past, he 
stresses the services that the climate has provided over generations: 
by exacerbating or locking-in Earth’s energy imbalance, such government action 
jeopardizes the signal features of the relatively benign and favorable climate system 
that, over the last 10,000 years, enabled civilization to develop and nature to thrive, 
as I have discussed. These features included relatively stable coastlines, moderate 
weather, fertile soils, and dependable hydrological systems – the natural capital on 
which the lives of Plaintiffs depend no less than did the lives of their parents and their 
forebears. (Hansen 2015, para. 71) 
Of the present, instead of stressing the usual environmental disbenefits already being 
felt by certain communities as a result of climate change, he claims that the current 
generation will be the last to experience the economic benefits of fossil fuels:  
                                                 
8 Elsewhere it similarly states: “The Maupin Century Farm has been passed from generation to generation 
in Alex’s family, and in many ways Alex’s future depends on that family farm. He would like to reside at, 
raise children on, and retire to the Maupin Century Farm, but he is concerned about how it will be further 
damaged by climate change caused by Defendants” (Juliana v US 2015, para. 28). 
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While prior generations and, to a certain extent, some in our present generation have 
benefitted and, even, been enriched by the exploitation of fossil fuels, our children 
and their progeny will not similarly benefit. (Idem, para. 74) 
Finally, in relation to the future, Hansen returns to listing a range of environmental 
harms that are likely to be experienced by future generations as a result of unabated 
greenhouse gas emissions: 
If fossil fuel emissions are not systematically and rapidly abated, as I have discussed 
above – including in the materials that I have incorporated by reference – then Youth 
and Future Generations Plaintiffs will confront what reasonably only can be described 
as, at best, an inhospitable future. That future may be marked by rising seas, coastal 
city functionality loss, mass migrations, resource wars, food shortages, heat waves, 
mega-storms, soil depletion and desiccation, freshwater shortage, public health 
system collapse, and the extinction of increasing numbers of species. That is to 
mention only the start of it. (Idem, para. 74) 
4.2. Scientific frames 
As we have seen above, scientific time frames may be future looking, present-based 
or past looking. Future looking scientific time frames are ones where the effects of 
dangerous climate change have largely not yet occurred, remaining some way off in 
the modelled future. This takes us into the territory of the Paris Agreement, where 
states agreed to limit global warming well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and 
to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C. On the basis of current 
nationally determined contributions under Paris, the evidence suggests that the 2° 
target will not be met: 
Current policies presently in place around the world are projected to reduce baseline 
emissions and result in about 3.6°C warming above pre-industrial levels. The 
unconditional pledges or promises that governments have made, including NDCs as 
of 1 November 2016, would limit warming to about 2.8°C above pre-industrial levels 
(…) both the current policy and pledge trajectories lie well above emissions pathways 
consistent with the Paris Agreement long-term temperature goal. (Climate Action 
Tracker n.d.) 
However, it is also clear that we do still have time to stave off climate change taking 
us to temperatures above 1.5°C. As Climate Action Tracker observes: 
even starting from emission levels implied by INDCs and current policy projections, 
1.5°C and 2°C pathways are still technically feasible. However, the resulting emission 
pathways are increasingly expensive as they are not consistent with the most cost-
efficient policies. Slower-than-optimal emission reductions early on need to be 
followed by faster reductions later on, effectively leading to significantly higher costs 
for the period 2030–2050 than would otherwise be needed.  While the challenges are 
significant, limiting warming to below 1.5°C by the end of the century is still feasible 
from current emissions levels. However, with every decade lost, these challenges and 
costs rise and will, at some point, become insurmountable with warming locked in to 
1.5 or 2°C and above. (Idem) 
This scientific time frame has found its way into some of the climate cases. Thus for 
example in his submission as part of the OCT Juliana litigation, James Hansen 
comments that “[t]here is still time and opportunity to preserve a habitable climate 
system – if we pursue a rational course. I will outline the glide path that we think 
remains feasible” (Hansen 2015, para. 19).9 
Hence the future scientific time frame tells us that, based on scientific models, we do 
still have time10 to avoid dangerous global warming and to keep within the Paris 
temperature goals. Dangerous temperatures above those goals are not yet with us, 
                                                 
9 To similar effect, see the Urgenda Foundation summons (Urgenda 2014, paras. 23-24). 
10 We do also still need time: “Of course, an abrupt cessation of all CO2 emissions, whether this year or in 
2030, is unrealistic. Industry, other business, and consumers all need time to retool and reinvest in 
emission-free options to fossil fuels” (Hansen 2015, para. 64). 
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remaining some way off in the future. In that sense they are not an immediate or 
imminent risk. 
Other cases have emphasised much more of a present-based scientific time frame. 
Thus in the Urgenda v Netherlands (2015) case, the court described Urgenda’s case 
as claiming, inter alia, that “[t]he greenhouse gas emissions in the Netherlands 
additionally contribute to the (imminent) hazardous climate change” (para. 3.2);11 
and, in its final order itself, the court stated that “[t]he State must do more to avert 
the imminent danger caused by climate change”. Similarly in the Kivalina v 
ExxonMobil (2012) case where a Native American community in Alaska was seeking 
compensation for climate resettlement, the villagers alleged that Exxon, the oil and 
gas supermajor, emitted “massive amounts of greenhouse gases that contribute to 
global warming which, in turn, has severely eroded the land where the City of Kivalina 
sits and threatens it with imminent destruction” (p. 11648, emphasis added). The 
present-based scientific time frame is essentially claiming that climate harms are 
already happening in the present or are imminent. This of course relies on current 
extreme weather events (including storm surges affecting coastal villages like 
Kivalina) being scientifically attributable to climate change. That remains a 
developing area within climate science. While it may be possible to attribute certain 
extreme weather events to global warming (e.g. those directly associated with 
heating such as more extreme heatwaves) – this is not yet possible for the full range 
of potential climate impacts. The extent to which one can legitimately state that 
climate harm is present or imminent is therefore limited. 
Kivalina (2012) is also a good example of a case containing a past or backward 
looking scientific time frame. The township alleged that Exxon “knew that their 
individual greenhouse gas emissions were, in combination with emissions and 
conduct of others, contributing to global warming and causing injuries to entities such 
as the Plaintiffs” (p. 11675). In other words, it was, they argued, foreseeable at the 
time that their emissions would contribute to climate change harms as a type of 
damage. This past knowledge, albeit based on foreseeability of the future, is central 
to nuisance claims like that of the plaintiffs against Exxon here. 
However, the court’s rejection of Kivalina’s case in the end turned mostly on factual 
causation and the inability of the plaintiff’s to single out Exxon’s precise contribution 
to their injury from a vast array of emitters. This rejection was itself very much 
couched in the language of time: 
Further, Kivalina’s allegations of their injury and traceability to Appellees’ activities 
is not bounded in time. Kivalina does not identify when their injury occurred nor tie 
it to Appellees’ activities within this vast time frame. Kivalina nevertheless seeks to 
hold these particular Appellees, out of all the greenhouse gas emitters who ever have 
emitted greenhouse gases over hundreds of years, liable for their injuries. (Kivalina 
2012, p. 11675) 
4.3. Environmentalist policy time frames 
In judicial review-type climate cases, future looking scientific time frames are 
typically accompanied by environmentalist policy time frames which stress that 
climate change is an “urgent” problem, with governments encouraged to take 
“immediate” action now to tackle it, avoiding “delay” in doing so.12 The appeal 
(especially for developing countries) may be to take action on adaptation. In the 
                                                 
11 Cf. n. 13 below however – in reality, Urgenda’s case involved much more like a future scientific time 
frame (matched with an environmentalist policy time frame described further in the main text below). 
12 Note that, in describing a “scientific time frame”, I am not claiming that science does not sometimes, or 
often even, itself step over into what I have characterised as a separate, policy-making one. For example, 
in the context of Paris, Jacqueline Peel et al. state that: “Moreover, in pushing out the start date of any 
new climate change international legal arrangement to 2020, the disjuncture between climate change 
science (urging immediate action), and the international political process has been starkly highlighted” 
(Peel et al. 2012, p. 247). I am merely suggesting that it is useful to separate out the two types of time 
frames and scientific is the ideal typical category I happen to have chosen for the first one.  
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Lahore Leghari v Pakistan case (2015), for example, the judge, Syed Mansoor Ali 
Shah, states that: “[a]s Pakistan is not a major contributor to global warming it is 
actually a victim of climate change and requires immediate remedial adaptation 
measures to cope with the disruptive climatic patterns” (para. 3). However, more 
typically (and especially for developed countries), it involves a call for mitigation. 
Hence, in the Juliana case, Hansen directly follows the statement quoted above about 
still having time with the comment: “though further delay in taking effective action 
will consign that effort to failure. Objectively, then, the situation is urgent and what 
governments and other decision-makers do, or do not do, today to reduce carbon 
pollution matters immensely” (Hansen 2015, para. 19, emphasis added). 
The main Youth submission similarly states that “[a]bsent immediate, meaningful 
action by Defendants to cease their permitting, authorizing, subsidizing, and 
supporting fossil fuel exploitation, production, and consumption, and otherwise to act 
to phase-out CO2 emissions, Plaintiffs would suffer increasingly severe consequences” 
(Juliana v US, para. 97, emphasis added). This quote makes it quite clear that the 
kinds of actions expressed as needing to be done immediately are very much policy 
actions – hence the policy time frame. I have chosen to call it an “environmentalist” 
policy time frame because those leaning more towards the climate-sceptic right would 
not regard the need for policy action as immediate. They would play for time and 
prefer a policy of wait and see. In truth, however, the environmentalist position is, 
in this context, very much the mainstream one. In other words, use of the 
environmentalist epithet should not be taken as expressing a particularly radical 
position in climate policy terms.  
There is thus a tension or dissonance (although no necessary incompatibility) 
between a future looking scientific approach to time – one where the effects of 
dangerous climate change have not yet occurred and remain some way off in the 
modelled future – and an environmentalist policy approach to time, where action is 
needed immediately, now. A tension also exists between future and present scientific 
time frames, with one emphasising future damage and the other pointing to the fact 
that it is happening now. Of course no such tension exists between the present-based 
scientific time frame and the policy time frame: for both the problem is current, 
imminent or immediate. Thus, whether one sees climate change as an immediate 
risk depends on which view of time is adopted. A future, effects-based scientific view 
would argue that it is not an immediate risk because the world has not yet warmed 
by the scientifically established amount (1.5-2°C) at which point climate change is 
assumed to become dangerous. A policy-based view, in contrast, regards climate 
change as an immediate risk in the sense that it is a risk that requires immediate 
action. A present-based scientific time frame argues that some climate change harms 
are already happening or about to happen (even if dangerous global warming in the 
1.5-2°C range is not yet upon us) and hence that the risk is present or imminent. 
However, as we have seen, this present-based time frame may well pose attribution 
problems. In any event, where one sees what may appear to be a present-based 
scientific time frame (as in the Urgenda judgment quoted above), it is conceivable 
that what is really meant is a policy time frame and that confusion has resulted in 
the present-based scientific version being wrongly used instead.13 
The tension between future scientific time frames and policy time frames is not 
particularly an issue within proactive judicial review-type cases such as Juliana, 
where, as we saw in relation to James Hansen’s evidence, both time frames can sit 
relatively happily together. Where the policy frame and indeed the present scientific 
time frame – i.e. both immediate-type frames – do pose problems is for the criminal 
courts in certain reactive climate change litigation cases. Reactive cases involve 
climate activists taking protest action and then facing criminal prosecution (Hilson 
2012, Hayes 2013). They have then often sought to raise defences which allow scope 
                                                 
13 I am not suggesting that Urgenda is an example of such confusion – just that it could be and that 
litigants and courts should be careful with which frame they really mean in a particular context. 
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for them to make broader political arguments about climate change and their 
motivations for action. In the famous UK Kingsnorth case (2008), which involved 
painting a slogan on the chimney stack of a coal-fired power station, the protestors 
were also able to call upon the scientist James Hansen as an expert witness in their 
subsequent trial for criminal damage. 
In his evidence in Kingsnorth, Hansen himself adopts both a future scientific time 
frame and a policy time frame: 
It will be necessary to return atmospheric CO2 to 350 ppm or lower on a time scale 
of centuries, if we hope to avoid destabilization of the ice sheets, minimize species 
extinctions, and halt and reverse the many regional climate trends discussed above. 
There is just barely still time to accomplish that, but it requires an immediate 
moratorium on new coalfired power plants that do not capture and sequester CO2 
and a phase out of existing coal plants over the next 20 years. (Hansen 2017, p. 10) 
He also speaks of the defendants’ actions with reference to both present and future 
generational time framing, stating that a “realization that the actions needed to 
protect life and property of the present and future generations were not being taken 
undoubtedly played a role in the decision of the defendants to act as they did" (Idem, 
p. 14). 
However, from a specific time perspective, Hansen’s evidence is not really directly 
on-point for the defence of lawful excuse raised by the defendants in relation to their 
criminal damage charge. Like the necessity defence more typically used in climate 
change cases (Schwarz 2010), lawful excuse requires protestors to demonstrate that 
they are acting to prevent an immediate risk of harm – here from global warming. In 
this respect, the evidence of the Inuit also heard in the case was arguably more 
relevant, as this involved details of damage presently being suffered by their coastal 
communities because of climate change. As Inuit leader Aqqaluk Lynge stated: 
Climate change affects my community, the Inuit people, by affecting their 
environment, which we see is more polluted due to increased shipping, the kind and 
numbers of species that they hunt, the house and camp constructions that they have 
to build on melting and unpredictable soils, the unpredictable weather (…) the sliding 
of houses into the sea (…) the reduction of habitats for polar bears and other species, 
and the introduction of new pest species. (Aqqaluk Lynge, quoted in Greenpeace UK 
2008) 
In the end, the protestors were acquitted by the jury. However, this famous jury trial 
acquittal in a case of reactive climate change litigation clearly had the capacity to be 
legally disruptive. Fisher et al. (2017) argue that climate change is highly disruptive 
of adjudicative processes and discuss a number of instances where courts have 
struggled to recognise climate change within existing legal doctrine, such as laws on 
standing or justiciability. Although they do not analyse criminal cases, their 
arguments also apply to reactive climate change litigation, which has the potential to 
be disruptive in terms of the wider criminal law. A criminal court cannot easily admit 
an environmentalist policy time frame, saying that immediate policy action is required 
by politicians, because defendants are likely to be arguing that this immediately 
required policy action has been lacking and that this is precisely what justifies their 
protest action and provides a lawful excuse for it.  Neither can such a court easily 
admit a present scientific time frame, because to admit that climate change is causing 
present damage to others is also potentially to provide protestors with an automatic 
workable defence to some of the key criminal charges that might be brought against 
them. Criminal courts, in other words, may be reluctant to admit or affirm such 
frames because of a fear of the consequences – not for climate change (which may 
be positive), but for law and order. They are, in effect, potentially caught between a 
rock and a hard place: they cannot easily deny the need for immediate policy action 
or the science of present harm (for fear of appearing like climate deniers); however 
neither can they easily admit, as a matter of law, either of the respective time frames 
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associated with these (for fear of acquitting those they see as having broken the law 
and deserving of sanction).  
The Basto case (R v Basto, 2016), involving climate protestors from Plane Stupid, 
provides a good example of a UK court finding a way around this conundrum in 
relation to the present science time frame. The activists were charged, inter alia, with 
aggravated trespass for illegally entered the northern runway at Heathrow Airport 
and erecting a structure which resulted in the suspension of flights for several hours. 
The judge noted that each of the defendants believed that “[c]limate change is 
already causing deaths around the world as a result of storms, droughts, floods and 
other catastrophic weather related events” and that “unless something is done to 
reduce carbon emissions climate change that is likely to be catastrophic to mankind 
will occur. The need to change is urgent” (R v Basto. 2016, para. 39). What we see 
here on the part of the defendants, in other words, is a present scientific time frame 
(“already causing deaths”) followed by a future time frame (catastrophic climate 
change “will occur”) and a policy time frame (“urgent” need to change). However, in 
rejecting their necessity defence the judge ruled as follows: 
None of the defendants knew of anyone who was at immediate or even impending 
risk of death at that point, either locally or worldwide. When asked, as they all were 
about what or who they believed to be at imminent risk of death or serious injury on 
the 13th July 2015, no-one named anybody in particular. Apart from the generic risk 
of death from the effects of climate change globally and pollution locally, which the 
defendants believe is created by emissions, there was nothing to suggest that there 
was any particular risk that day (…). I found the defendants’ actions were symbolic 
and designed to make a point, not to save lives. Because of the very limited impact 
that the defendants’ actions would have had on climate change globally or on harmful 
polluting emissions in the surrounding areas of the airport, I did not accept that that 
they believed that there was any prospect that what they did could have saved lives 
or prevented serious injury. It goes without saying that I am not satisfied, therefore, 
that the defendants did believe that their actions were necessary to save life or 
prevent serious injury full stop, let alone in the very exceptional circumstances that 
would afford them a defence of necessity or duress of circumstances. The defence 
must therefore fail. (R v Basto, 2016, paras. 47-50) 
Thus, rather than entirely rejecting the present scientific time frame (which, as we 
have noted, is scientifically difficult for a court), the judge instead made it clear that 
he was looking for a very clear causal link between the action of the protestors in 
disrupting flights and preventing a specific serious present harm caused by climate 
change on that day. In this way, the judge managed to avoid legal disruption. One 
could still admit that climate change was causing present harm. However, it was not 
enough for the defendants to point to this is a generic sense; rather they had to 
establish that their action reduced emissions and that they could show that this 
prevented someone, somewhere specific, from suffering serious climate change 
injury. However, as the judgment makes clear, they were unable to do this because 
even if they could show that flights cancelled as a result of their action led to reduced 
carbon emissions, these were likely to have been cancelled out by knock-on effects 
such as increased stacking and re-routing. 
US courts have taken a variety of approaches in reactive climate change litigation. 
In the Flood Wall Street 10 case, a number of activists protesting against Wall Street’s 
involvement with fossil fuels were prosecuted for disorderly conduct and sought to 
raise the necessity defence. The judge acknowledged the seriousness of climate 
change, but disallowed the defence, ruling that climate change involved “generalized 
and continuing harm” rather than the required imminent threat of injury (Nathanson 
2015). In the Delta 5 case (Washington v Brockway, 2016), protestors were 
prosecuted for attempting to block an oil train. While the judge initially allowed the 
activists to present the necessity defence, in the end he instructed the jury to ignore 
it, ruling that the defendants had failed to prove that alternative, lawful avenues to 
address climate change were unavailable (Carswell 2016, Long and Hamilton 2017). 
The former case seems to require climate harm to be linked with a specific time and 
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place, arguing that it is, instead, spatially diffuse and temporally continuing. The 
latter case is more like Basto (2016) in the sense that it turns to causation to rule 
out the defence. However, rather than requiring protestors to show that their actions 
were causally sufficient to prevent specific harm, here they were required to 
demonstrate that no other lawful action such as lobbying could have caused the policy 
change needed to prevent harm.      
5. Conclusion 
We have seen that climate science is linked to the temporal aspects of climate change 
in three senses. First, there is the debate about what GHG emissions are required to 
keep us within the two degrees warming threshold, above which climate change is 
widely considered to be dangerous. Time here becomes a matter of how long we have 
left, based on climate modelling, to take action before we reach two degrees. The 
risks of climate change here lie in the future. Second, there is an attempt by climate 
science to discuss the here and now – the present. So for example, while not able to 
attribute causal responsibility for particular cyclonic activity to climate change, 
climate scientists have nevertheless shown a degree of correlation between warming 
and the prevalence of extreme weather events. And third, climate science may be 
used to try to attribute liability to major GHG emitters for their past, historical 
emissions. When we see such arguments presented in court cases, these represent 
future, present and past scientific time frames respectively.  
With the first of these, the science may be telling us that most harm remains some 
way off in the future; however, because it is not that far off and because, if we do 
not cut emissions, the harm will be even more serious, then we should be making 
such cuts immediately. The science tells us that most of the harm is not imminent – 
it lies in the future as a risk; but it also signals to us that the need for preventive 
policy action on mitigation is immediate in order to avert that future risk. This is the 
environmentalist policy time frame. 
I have argued that there is potentially a tension between future scientific time frames 
and both environmentalist policy time frames and present scientific time frames, with 
the former emphasising the future and the latter two the present. However, in most 
cases this tension is not a particular source of problems: the frames often sit quite 
happily side by side. There is also scope for confusing time frames which look similar. 
It is, for example, easy to imagine present scientific time frames and 
environmentalist policy time frames getting mixed up, unless ones is clear that the 
former is talking about present or imminent harm and the latter about the need for 
immediate policy action. 
I also argued that time frames have the potential to cause legal disruption, 
particularly in reactive climate change cases. We saw there that the courts are placed 
in a difficult position. On the one hand they cannot easily admit that climate change 
harm is happening or that avoiding future climate change requires immediate action, 
because this could provide protestors with a legitimate defence for civil disobedience 
which the courts are reluctant to condone. On the other hand, it is increasingly 
difficult for anyone, let alone a public body like a court with claims to legitimacy, to 
deny the realities of climate change. In the end, we saw that the courts have 
managed to avoid legal disruption by a variety of routes, including requiring very 
precisely traced causation, which few protestors will be able to satisfy. 
Finally, scientific and policy time frames are somewhat abstract and impersonal. They 
are not frames which are likely to resonate with the broader public outside the court 
room. Generational time frames – which are typically associated with a compelling 
human narrative appealing to place as well as time – are much better in this respect. 
As in the Our Children’s Trust cases, social movements should therefore consider 
employing the latter as well as the former frames. 
Chris Hilson   Framing Time in… 
 
Oñati Socio-legal Series, v. 9, n. 3 (2019), 361-379 
ISSN: 2079-5971 376 
References 
Caney, S., 2014. Climate change, intergenerational equity and the social discount 
rate. Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 13(4), 320–342. 
Carswell, C., 2016. In Washington, activists and the “necessity defense” on trial. 
High Country News [online], 2 February. Available from: 
https://www.hcn.org/issues/48.2/in-washington-the-necessity-defense-on-
trial-alongside-activists [Accessed 1 June 2018]. 
Climate Action Tracker, n.d. Addressing Global Warming [online]. Available from: 
https://climateactiontracker.org/global/temperatures/ [Accessed 22 May 
2018]. 
Crawford, A., 2015 Temporality in restorative justice: On time, timing and time-
consciousness. Theoretical Criminology [online], 19(4), 470-490. Available 
from: 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1362480615575804?journalCo
de=tcra [Accessed 1 June 2018]. 
de Sadeleer, N., 2016. Climate change, uncertainties and the precautionary 
principle. Jean Monnet Working Paper Series, Environment and Internal 
Market [online], 2016/1. Available from: 
http://www.tradevenvironment.eu/uploads/2016_CC_PP.pdf [Accessed 1 June 
2018]. 
Fisher, E., 2002. Precaution, precaution everywhere: Developing a “common 
understanding” of the precautionary principle in the European Community. 
Maastricht Journal of European & Comparative Law [online], 9(1), 7-28. 
Available from: 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1023263X0200900102 
[Accessed 1 June 2018]. 
Fisher, E., Scotford, E. and Barritt, E., 2017. The legally disruptive nature of climate 
change. The Modern Law Review [online], 80(2), 173–201. Available from: 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12251 [Accessed 1 June 2018]. 
Greenpeace UK, 2008. Kingsnorth trial day six: the summing up. Facebook [online], 
8 September. Available from: https://www.facebook.com/notes/greenpeace-
uk/kingsnorth-trial-day-six-the-summing-up/25875159538/ [Accessed 22 May 
2018]. 
Hänggli, R., and Kriesi, H., 2012. Frame construction and frame promotion 
(strategic framing choices). American Behavioral Scientist [online], 56(3), 
260-278. Available from: 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0002764211426325 [Accessed 
1 June 2018]. 
Hansen, J.E., 2015. Statement of witness James E. Hansen [Kingsnorth case] 
(online). Available from: 
http://www.forestecologynetwork.org/climate_change/Hansen_Kingsnorth_tes
timony.pdf [Accessed 22 May 2018]. 
Hansen, J.E., 2017. Declaration of Dr. James E. Hansen in Support of Plaintiffs 
[case Juliana v US] (online). New York, 11 August. Available from: 
http://www.columbia.edu/~jeh1/mailings/2015/20150812_FINAL_HANSEN_D
EC_FOR_US_DISTRICT_OREGON_9pm.pdf [Accessed 22 May 2018]. 
Hayes, G., 2013- Negotiating proximity: Expert testimony and collective memory in 
the trials of environmental activists in France and the United Kingdom. Law & 
Policy [online], 35(3), 208-235. Available from: 
https://doi.org/10.1111/lapo.12004 [Accessed 1 June 2018]. 
Chris Hilson   Framing Time in… 
 
 
Oñati Socio-legal Series, v. 9, n. 3 (2019), 361-379 
ISSN: 2079-5971 377 
Hilson, C., 2012. UK climate change litigation: between hard and soft framing. In: 
S. Farrall, T. Ahmed and D. French, eds. Criminological and legal 
consequences of climate change. Oxford: Hart, pp. 47-61. 
Lees, E., 2017. Responsibility and liability for climate loss and damage after Paris. 
Climate Policy [online], 17(1), 59-70. Available from: 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2016.1197095 [Accessed 1 June 2018]. 
Long, L.N., and Hamilton, T., 2017. Case Comment—Washington v. Brockway: One 
Small Step Closer to Climate Necessity. McGill Journal of Sustainable 
Development Law [online], 13(1), 151-179. Available from: 
https://www.mcgill.ca/mjsdl/files/mjsdl/hamilton_and_long_march_31.pdf 
[Accessed 1 June 2018]. 
McKinnon, C., 2012. Climate change and future justice: Precaution, compensation 
and triage. Abingdon: Routledge. 
Nathanson, R., 2015. Climate-change activists consider the necessity defense. The 
New Yorker [online], 11 April. Available from: 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/climate-change-activists-
consider-the-necessity-defense [Accessed 1 June 2018]. 
Osofsky, H.M., 2005. The geography of climate change litigation: Implications for 
transnational regulatory governance. Washington University Law Quarterly 
[online], 83(6), 1789-1855. Available from: https://wustllawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/3-40.pdf [Accessed 1 June 2018]. 
Our Children’s Trust, n.d. Securing the Legal Right to a Safe Climate and a Healthy 
Atmosphere for all Present and Future Generations [homepage] (online). 
Available from: https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/ [Accessed 22 May 2018]. 
Page, E., 2006. Climate change, justice and future generations. Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar. 
Peel, J., Godden, L., and Keenan, R.J., 2012. Climate change law in an era of multi-
level governance. Transnational Environmental Law [online], 1(2), 245-280. 
Available from: https://doi.org/10.1017/S2047102512000052 [Accessed 1 
June 2018]. 
Richardson, B.J., 2017a. Doing time – The temporalities of environmental law. In: 
L. Kotze, ed., Environmental Law and Governance for the Anthropocene. 
Oxford: Hart, pp. 55-74. 
Richardson, B.J., 2017b. Time and Environmental Law: Telling Nature’s Time. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Rogers, N., 2013. Climate change litigation and the awfulness of lawfulness. 
Alternative Law Journal [online], 38, 20-24. Available from: 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1037969X1303800105 
[Accessed 1 June 2018]. 
Rogers, N., 2015. If you obey all of the rules you miss all the fun: Climate change 
litigation, climate change activism and lawfulness. New Zealand Journal of 
Public and International Law [online], 13(1), 179-199. Available from: 
https://epubs.scu.edu.au/law_pubs/417/ [Accessed 1 June 2018]. 
Schwarz, M., 2010. The Drax 29 and the Kingsnorth 6: Different defences, different 
outcomes. ELFline [online], spring-summer. Available from: 
https://www.bindmans.com/uploads/files/documents/elf_line_article_Spring_
Summer_2010__2_.pdf [Accessed 1 June 2018]. 
The Constitution [of Norway], as laid down on 17 May 1814 by the Constituent 
Assembly at Eidsvoll and subsequently amended, most recently in May 2018 
[online], Article 112. Available from: 
Chris Hilson   Framing Time in… 
 
Oñati Socio-legal Series, v. 9, n. 3 (2019), 361-379 
ISSN: 2079-5971 378 
https://www.stortinget.no/globalassets/pdf/english/constitutionenglish.pdf 
[Accessed 5 June 2018]. 
Urgenda, 2014. Summons in the Case: Urgenda Foundation v Kingdom of the 
Netherlands (Final draft Translation) [online]. 25 June. Available from: 
http://www.urgenda.nl/wp-content/uploads/Translation-Summons-in-case-
Urgenda-v-Dutch-State-v.25.06.10.pdf [Accessed 22 May 2018]. 
Vanhala, L., and Hestbaek, C., 2016. Framing climate change loss and damage in 
UNFCCC negotiations. Global Environmental Politics [online], 16(4), 111-129. 
Available from: 
https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1162/GLEP_a_00379 
[Accessed 1 June 2018]. 
Vanhala, L., and Hilson, C., 2013. Climate change litigation: Symposium 
introduction. Law & Policy [online], 35(3), 141-149. Available from: 
https://doi.org/10.1111/lapo.12007 [Accessed 1 June 2018]. 
Case law 
District Court of Oregon, Eugene Div., 2015. Kelsey Cascade Rose Juliana et al. v 
the United States of America et al. Case No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC [online]. 
Available from: 
https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/s/YouthAmendedComplaintAgainstUS-
t9f3.pdf [Accessed 22 May 2018]. 
Hague District Court, judgment of 24 June 2015. Urgenda Foundation v The 
Netherlands. Case No. C/09/456689/HA ZA 13-1396 [online]. Available from: 
https://elaw.org/system/files/urgenda_0.pdf [Accessed 22 May 2018]. 
Lahore High Court, Pakistan, judgment of 4 September 2015. Ashgar Leghari v 
Federation of Pakistan. Case No: W.P. No. 25501/2015 [online]. Available 
from: https://cer.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Leghari-1.pdf 
[Accessed 22 May 2018]. 
Maidstone Crown Court, The Kingsnorth Six Trial, September 2008. Summary 
available at http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/the-kingsnorth-six-trial/ 
[Accessed 31 May 2018]. 
New York City Criminal Court, judgment of 5 March 2015. People v Shalauder [also 
known as Flood Wall Street 10]. Case No. 2014NY076969.  
Oslo District Court judgment of 4 January 2018. Case no.: 16-16667TVI-OTIR/06, 
Föreningen Greenpeace Norden v Government of Norway through the Ministry 
of Petroleum and Energy [online]. Available from: https://tinyurl.com/yatkfvrv 
[Accessed 22 May 2018]. 
Snohomish County District Court, Washington, judgment of 13 January 2016. 
Washington v Brockway [also known as Delta 5 case]. Case No. 5053A-14D.  
Supreme Court of the Philippines judgment of 30 July 1993. Minors Oposa v 
Secretary of the Department of Environmental and Natural Resources. Case 
No.: 33 IL; 173 (1994) [online]. Available from: https://tinyurl.com/m2jvglg 
[Accessed 22 May 2018]. 
United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, 2012. Native Village of Kivalina v 
ExxonMobil Corp, No. 09-17490 [online]. Available from: 
http://climatecasechart.com/case/native-village-of-kivalina-v-exxonmobil-
corp/ ] [Accessed 31 May 2018]. 
Urgenda, n.d. The Urgenda climate case against the Dutch government [online]. 
Available from: http://www.urgenda.nl/en/themas/climate-case/ [Accessed 22 
May 2018]. 
Chris Hilson   Framing Time in… 
 
 
Oñati Socio-legal Series, v. 9, n. 3 (2019), 361-379 
ISSN: 2079-5971 379 
West London Magistrates' Court Sitting at Willesden, judgment of 24 February 
2016. R v Robert Anthony Basto and others [online]. Available from: 
https://www.bindmans.com/uploads/files/documents/Judgment_January_201
6.pdf [Accessed 22 May 2018].  
 
 
 
